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The Introduction of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases
by H. Patrick Furman
S cientific evidence is being used
in an increasing number of crim-
inal cases. An expert witness of-
fering testimony about such mat-
ters as scientific experiments, test results
and psychological syndromes appeals to
the jury's desire for "the facts" and cre-
ates a scientific aura that may significant-
ly strengthen a case.
Criminal lawyers have long been fa-
miliar with certain types of expert scien-
tific testimony. Experts have testified for
years about the results of fingerprint
comparisons, ballistics tests, alcohol con-
centration in the blood and handwriting
examination. There is a clear trend among
criminal lawyers toward using more ex-
pert testimony. There is also an equally
clear trend among the courts to allow the
introduction of more and different types
of such testimony.
This article explores issues relating to
the admissibility of expert testimony. The
two legal tests used to evaluate such tes-
timony are discussed, as are specific ap-
plications of these tests and some mis-
cellaneous issues. The use of expert tes-
timony in sanity cases is not discussed.
The Two Standards of
Admissibility
Since 1923, the Frye test1 has been the
traditional and most widely used way of
judging the admissibility of scientific ev-
idence. The defendant in Frye v. U.S. at-
tempted to introduce evidence of a sys-
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tolic blood pressure test which he claimed
showed that he was telling the truth
when he denied responsibility for the of-
fense. After the trial court rejected this of-
fer, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction. Acknowl-
edging that it is not always easy to deter-
mine precisely when a scientific test
moves from the experimental to the de-
monstrable state, the appellate court held
that scientific evidence should not be ad-
mitted unless the principles on which the
procedure is based are "sufficiently es-
tablished to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it be-
longs."2
The second test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence is set forth in Colora-
do Rules of Evidence ("C.R.E.") 702, which
allows the introduction of "scientific, tech-
nical or other specialized knowledge [if it]
will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue." This is obviously an easier founda-
tional hurdle for counsel to clear than the
Frye test.
When introducing scientific evidence,
counsel first must determine which stan-
dard applies. The rule in Colorado, set
forth in People v. Hampton,3 is that the
Frye test should be applied "to novel sci-
entific devices and processes involving the
manipulation of physical evidence." 4 The
Hampton court suggested that, under this
definition, the Frye test would be appli-
cable to polygraph examinations, experi-
mental blood typing, processes, voice and
bite mark identification and microscopic
examination of gunshot residue. In the-
ory, scientific evidence which does not fit
the Hampton description should be eval-
uated using C.R.E. 702.
Application of C.R.E. 702 Test
The test of C.R.E. 702 was described
further in the recent Colorado Supreme
Court case of People v. Fasy.5 During the
trial of the defendant for sexual assault
on achild, the prosecution introduced evi-
dence from a psychologist that the victim
suffered from post-traumatic stress dis-
order. The Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction,6 finding that the
testimony amounted to an improper as-
sertion that the victim was being truth-
ful on a particular occasion.7 The Colora-
do Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and reinstated the conviction,
finding the testimony admissible under
C.R.E. 702.
The Supreme Court noted that the
C.R.E. 702 standard should be employed
on a case-by-case basis. It directed trial
courts to ask the following question: "On
this subject can a jury from this person
receive appreciable help."8 [Italics in orig-
inal.] The court then found that the psy-
chologist's testimony assisted the jury in
understanding the victim's behavior-
particularly her symptoms-and her de-
lay in notifying the authorities after the
incident.
In Hampton,9 the Colorado Supreme
Court used the C.R.E. 702 test to approve
the introduction of "rape trauma syn-
drome" evidence. The court held that, un-
der C.R.E. 702, rape trauma syndrome
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evidence was admissible because it was
helpful to the jury in understanding the
delay in the reporting of the offense. Un-
derstanding this delay, the court said,
would help the jury decide whether a sex-
ual assault had occurred.
In Campbell v. People,10 the Colorado
Supreme Court held that C.R.E. 702 was
the proper test to determine the admis-
sibility of expert testimony relating to
the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion. The court rejected the prosecutions
argument that there should be a per se
rule barring expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification. It also rejected the
defense argument that there should be
a per se rule that such evidence was ad-
missible. Reiterating that the Frye testis
still applicable to new scientific proce-
dures, the court described this identifi-
cation testimony as involving
an explanation by a psychologist on
how certain factors, such as stress
and post-event information, can affect
memory and perception, and thus eye-
witness identification."
The court held that C.R.E. 702 was the
appropriate test. It specifically noted that
its decision is not intended to open the
floodgates for the introduction of such
evidence.
On remand, the trial court reviewed
the offer of proof as to the expert testimo-
ny concerning the weaknesses inherent
in eyewitness identification and re-af-
firmed its decision to exclude the testi-
mony. The trial court therefore affirmed
the defendant's conviction without a new
trial. The trial court did find that the tes-
timony was admissible in the companion
case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals re-
versed.
12
The court held that expert testimony
on eyewitness identification should be
evaluated using the test established in
United States v. Downing.13 The three
factors to be considered are (1) the relia-
bility of the scientific principles on which
the testimony is based, (2) the danger
that the testimony may overwhelm or
mislead the jury and (3) the degree to
which the testimony "fits" the specific
case at hand. Using this test, the court
found the expert testimony admissible
under C.R.E. 702, largely because of the
good "fit" between the testimony and the
facts.
The trial court found that the proba-
tive value in this expert testimony was
substantially outweighed by the danger
that it would confuse or mislead the jury
and excluded the testimony under C.R.E.
403. The Court of Appeals rejected this
conclusion, particularly in light of the
fact that the trial court was willing to al-
low the testimony to be introduced in the
companion case. The court made clear its
agreement with the Supreme Court's
warning that this decision was not in-
tended to open the floodgates to expert
testimony on this issue. It is clear that
the specific facts of each case will bear
strongly on the admissibility of expert
testimony on identification.




for the Frye test."
In People v. Young, 14 the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the defendant's man-
slaughter conviction, in part because the
trial court refused to allow her to present
expert testimony in support of her claims
of self-defense and heat of passion. The
Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution
argument that this subject matter was
within the knowledge of the jury and not-
ed that this testimony would have been
helpful to the jury in deciding the claims
of self-defense and heat of passion, which
is all that C.R.E. 702 requires. For the
same reason, the court rejected the trial
court's conclusion that the testimony
would have been a waste of time and ex-
cludable under C.R.E. 403.
The defendant in Lanari v. People15
sought to introduce expert psychiatric evi-
dence about the characteristics of heat of
passion and about his state of mind in de-
fense of the allegation that he shot his
wife and a friend. The trial court barred
this testimony, reasoning that heat of pas-
sion was within the knowledge ofjurors
and that neither insanity nor impaired
mental condition had been raised. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. 16 However, the
Supreme Court held it erroneous to hold
that expert opinion is never available in
heat-of-passion cases.'7 The Supreme
Court held that such evidence should be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis under
C.R.E. 702.
Application of the Frye Test
Compared to the use of C.R.E. 702,
there are far fewer situations in which
the courts apply the Frye test. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court has applied the Frye
test only to polygraph examinations. 8
The Court of Appeals has applied the test
to certain serological examinations and
to D.N.A. testing. The Supreme Court is
currently reviewing the decision involv-
ing the D.N.A. testing.
In People v. Saathoff,19 the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the defendant's murder
conviction against a claim, among others,
that the trial court improperly allowed
a prosecution expert witness to testify
about multi-system electrophoresis blood
testing. A forensic serologist was quali-
fied as an expert and testified that elec-
trophoresis is a technique used to sepa-
rate proteins-such as those found in
blood-on the basis of their electrical
charge. The results appear as banding
patterns on a gelled plate. The expert tes-
tified that multi-system electrophoresis
is widely accepted in the scientific com-
munity as a method of typing blood and
that the accepted procedures were uti-
lized in this case.
Several other states have found mul-
ti-system electrophoresis blood testing
to be reliable and admissible. 0 In Saat-
hoff, the Court of Appeals employed the
Frye test and held that the evidence pre-
sented was adequate to support the ad-
mission of electrophoresis test results.
In People v. Banks,21 the Court of Ap-
peals assumed, without being entirely
certain, that the Frye test was applica-
ble to evidence that the defendant was a
"weak secretor." On this understanding,
the court affirmed the defendant's sexu-
Al assault conviction. The court held that
(1) the expert who testified was well qual-
ified; (2) the procedure itself, while un-
usual, is well accepted by experts; and
(3) the defendant had ample opportuni-
ty to cross-examine the expert.
In Hampton,22 the Supreme Court sug-
gested that the Frye test was applicable
to voice analysis. In People v. Drake,23 the
Court of Appeals appears to have taken
the hint. The defendant in Drake attempt-
ed to introduce evidence from a linguis-
tics specialist familiar with voice print
analysis. The offer of proof was that the
expert would testify that, on the basis of
voice inflection, speech pattern, intona-
tion and other characteristics, he had con-
cluded that certain tape-recorded state-
ments by the defendant were not truth-
ful.
The trial court concluded that the dis-
cipline of voice analysis was not suffi-
ciently established in the scientific com-
munity to permit the jury to consider
this testimony. The Court of Appeals
noted that many commentators and oth-
FebruaryTHE COLORADO LAWYER
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er courts had rejected voice analysis evi-
dence on the ground that it is not reli-
able. While the court did not cite either
Hampton or Frye, it appears to have
used Hampton's description of which
test to apply to determine that voice
analysis evidence should be examined
under Frye. The court then used the Frye
test to affirm the trial court's conclusion
that the evidence was not sufficiently
reliable.
DNA Comparisons
One important issue which is still un-
der consideration by the appellate courts
in Colorado is the use of DNA evidence.
In People v. Fishback,24 the Court of Ap-
peals held admissible the results of com-
parisons between the DNA of the defen-
dant and DNA found in semen samples
at the scene of the sexual assault with
which he was charged. Acknowledging
that this was a case of first impression
in Colorado, the court avoided deciding
which test applied to DNA evidence by
finding that the evidence proffered in
this case met either standard.
In Fishback, the Court of Appeals an-
alyzed the Frye test as raising the fol-
lowing three questions:
1) Is there a theory which supports
the conclusion that forensic test-
ing of DNA can produce reliable re-
sults?
2) Are there generally accepted tech-
niques capable of producing reli-
able techniques?
3) Were the accepted techniques used
in the case at hand?
In light of the expert testimony present-
ed on these three questions, the court
answered all three affirmatively. The
court went on to note that the C.R.E. 702
standard is more lenient than the Frye
test. The court found that the DNA evi-
dence helped the jury resolve the identi-
fication issue facing it, held that DNA
testing is an accepted method of proving
identification and deemed the results
admissible under C.R.E. 702 as well as
Frye.
Finally, the appellate court in Fish-
back rejected the defendant's argument
that the trial court should have given
his proffered jury instruction informing
the jury that, when considering the
DNA testimony, it could consider the
fact that DNA testing is based on new
technology. The trial court instead gave
the jury the standard instruction per-
taining to expert testimony. The Court
of Appeals held that this instruction is
all that is required.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case on May 11, 1992,
and, as of this writing, should be issuing
an opinion in the near future. The court's
description of the types of evidence to
which the Frye test applies suggests that
the court will use the Frye test to analyze
DNA evidence.
The DNA issue is complicated by the
fact that, while the scientific principles
underlying DNA comparisons are well
accepted, the procedures used to make
the actual comparisons and the statisti-
cal studies purporting to justify many of
the conclusions reached from such com-
parisons are still in their infancy. It is pos-
sible that one portion of the DNA analy-
sis process will pass muster but that an-
other will not. Other jurisdictions are
split on the admissibility of DNA com-
parisons.
Future of the Frye Test
The U.S. Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in a case with poten-
tially far-reaching implications for the
Frye test. That case, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,25 arose out
of the use of the anti-nausea drug Ben-
dectin by pregnant women. Certain off-
spring of these women who suffered from
I=CI
birth defects sued Merrell Dow, claiming
that Bendectin caused the defects. The
plaintiffs relied on certain unpublished
studies and on unpublished re-analysis of
certain epidemiological studies.
The trial court granted Merrell Dow's
motion for summary judgment. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 26 Both courts held that unpub-
lished studies, which had never been
subjected to the peer review process as-
sociated with publication, could not form
the basis for expert testimony. Without
such expert testimony, the plaintiffs' case
failed.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Daubert on three issues:
1) Do the Federal Rules of Evidence
("F.R.E.") eliminate the "general
acceptance" test of Frye?
2) Do federal courts possess inherent
power to create rules for excluding
evidence which exceed the require-
ments of F.R.E. 702, bypass the
traditional evidence rule-making
process and affect substantive state
tort law?
3) May courts constitutionally dele-
gate control over the admission of
expert testimony by establishing
the editors of peer review journals
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as the "recognized authorities" who
must approve a particular scientif-
ic process or procedure?
Obviously, the answers to these ques-
tions may significantly affect the intro-
duction of scientific evidence in federal
court. To the extent state courts follow
the lead of the federal courts, the impact
could affect decisions in state courts as
well.
Miscellaneous Issues
The use of experts and scientific testi-
mony is still circumscribed by the rele-
vancy requirement of C.R.E. 403. The
Campbell27 decision contained a re-
minder that the C.R.E. 702 test of ad-
missibility also requires the trial court
to engage in a C.R.E. 403 analysis. That
is, the trial court also should consider
whether the relevance of the evidence
is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence.
28
Defense counsel who are facing an ex-
pert from a state criminalistics laborato-
ry should remember that the prosecu-
tion can introduce reports generated by
such experts without live testimony from
the expert. In People v. Mayfield-Ulloa,29
the Court of Appeals affirmed the defen-
dant's conviction for cocaine possession
against a claim that the trial court im-
properly admitted lab results without a
live foundational witness. CRS § 16-3-309
(5) provides for the admission of crimin-
alistics reports without a live witness,
stating that a party wishing to adduce
live testimony concerning such reports
must notify the witness and the oppos-
ing party at least ten days before trial.
Appellate Review
It is important that counsel in state
trial courts persuade those courts to per-
mit the introduction of expert testimony.
Counsel should not rely on reversals in
the appellate courts because appellate
courts will give trial court decisions a
great deal of deference. Appellate courts
will not reverse a trial court decision un-
less it is manifestly erroneous.
30
The federal standard of appellate re-
view appears to be significantly differ-
ent. Federal appellate courts have taken
the position that a de novo review of a
decision concerning the introduction of
expert testimony is appropriate because
the answer to questions of reliability does
not vary from case to case.31 Because the
reliability of a certain process or proce-
dure does not vary in different factual
contexts, the trial court has no special
insight as to the admissibility of the evi-
dence. Therefore, the evidence may be
considered de novo by an appellate court.
Conclusion
It should be kept in mind that the re-
laxed test of C.R.E. 702 works both ways:
"What's sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander." Both prosecutors and defense
lawyers should be able to use C.R.E. 702
to broaden the scope of admissible sci-
entific evidence. While prosecutors tend
to use such evidence more often than de-
fense counsel, many of the cases discussed
are ones in which defense counsel tried to
introduce the scientific evidence. Effec-
tive prosecution and defense both require
the use of scientific evidence.
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